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S T É P H A N E  L A C R O I X
Al-Albani’s Revolutionary 
Approach to Hadith
When on the first of October 1999, 
Shaykh Muhammad Nasir al-Din al-Al-
bani passed away at the age of 85, he 
was mourned by virtually everyone 
in the world of Salafi Islam. To many, 
he represented its third main con-
temporary reference, after ‘Abd al-
‘Aziz bin Baz (who himself had died a 
few months before) and Muhammad 
bin ‘Uthaymin (who would pass away 
in January 2001), both leading figures of the Saudi religious estab-
lishment. Salafi newspapers, journals, and websites celebrated this 
Syrian son of an Albanian clock-maker—whose family left Albania 
in 1923, when he was nine years old, and re-established itself in Da-
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mascus—who had become known as 
the muhaddith al-‘asr (traditionist of 
the era), that is, the greatest hadith 
scholar of his generation.
How did al-Albani, with his undis-
tinguished social and ethnic origins, 
come to occupy such a prestigious 
position in a field long monopolized 
by a religious elite from the Saudi re-
gion of Najd? The answer, as we shall 
see through the example of al-Albani himself and some of his disci-
ples, lies in his revolutionary approach to hadith.
The Wahhabi paradox
Common knowledge considers Shaykh Nasir al-Din al-Albani to be a 
staunch proponent of Wahhabism, the discourse produced and upheld 
by the official Saudi religious establishment.1 This is undoubtedly true 
in terms of ‘aqidah (creed), yet al-Albani strongly disagrees with the 
Wahhabis—and especially with their chief representatives, the ulama 
of the Saudi religious establishment—when it comes to fiqh (law). 
There, al-Albani points to a fundamental contradiction within the Wah-
habi tradition: the latter’s proponents have advocated exclusive reli-
ance on the Quran, the Sunna, and the consensus of al-salaf al-salih 
(the pious ancestors), yet they have almost exclusively relied on Hanba-
li jurisprudence for their fatwas—acting therefore as proponents of a 
particular school of jurisprudence, namely Hanbalism. According to al-
Albani, this also applies to Muhammad bin ‘Abd al-Wahhab whom he 
describes as “salafi in creed, but not in fiqh.”
For al-Albani, moreover, being a proper “salafi in fiqh” implies making 
hadith the central pillar of the juridical process, for hadith alone may 
provide answers to matters not found in the Quran without relying on 
the school of jurisprudence. The mother of all religious sciences there-
fore becomes the “science of hadith,” which aims at re-evaluating the 
authenticity of known hadiths. According to al-Albani, however, inde-
pendent reasoning must be excluded from the process: the critique of 
the matn (the content of the hadith) should be exclusively formal, i.e. 
grammatical or linguistic; only the sanad (the hadith’s chain of trans-
mitters) may be properly put into question. As a consequence, the cen-
tral focus of the science of hadith becomes ‘ilm al-rijal (the science of 
men), also known as ‘ilm al-jarh wa-l-ta‘dil (the science of critique and 
fair evaluation), which evaluates the morality—deemed equivalent to 
the reliability—of the transmitters. At the same time—and contrary 
to earlier practices—al-Albani insists that the scope of this re-evalu-
ation must encompass all existing hadiths, even those included in the 
canonical collections of Bukhari and Muslim, some of which al-Albani 
went so far as to declare weak.2
Revolutionary interpretations 
As a consequence of the peculiarity of his method, al-Albani ended 
up pronouncing fatwas that ran counter to the wider Islamic consensus, 
and more specifically to Hanbali/Wahhabi jurisprudence. For instance, 
he wrote a book in which he redefined the proper gestures and formu-
lae that constitute the Muslim prayer ritual “according to the Prophet’s 
practice”—and contrary to the prescriptions of all established schools 
of jurisprudence. Also, he stated that mihrabs—the niche found in a 
mosques indicating the direction of Mecca—were bid‘a (an innovation) 
and declared licit to pray in a mosque with one’s shoes. Another con-
troversial position was his call for Palestinians to leave the occupied 
territories since, he claimed, they were unable to practice their faith 
there as they should—something which is much more important than 
a piece of land. Finally, al-Albani took a strong stance against indulging 
in politics, repeating that “the good policy is to abandon politics”—a 
In spite of his undistinguished social 
background al-Albani became known as the 
greatest hadith scholar of his generation. His 
reliance on hadith as the central pillar of law 
at the expense of the schools of jurisprudence 
caused him to take up controversial positions. 
This brought him into conflict with the Saudi 
religious establishment but also made him 
popular in Salafi circles.
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phrase implicitly aimed at the Muslim Brotherhood, whose political 
views he consistently denounced. 
The presence of al-Albani in Saudi Arabia—where he was invited in 
1961 by his good friend Shaykh ‘Abd al-‘Aziz bin Baz to teach at the 
Islamic University of Medina—prompted embarrassed reactions from 
the core of the Wahhabi establishment, who disagreed with him but 
could hardly attack him because of his impeccable Wahhabi creden-
tials in terms of creed. The controversy sparked by his book The Veil 
of the Muslim Woman, in which he argued that Muslim women should 
not cover their face—a position unacceptable by Saudi standards—, 
finally gave the Wahhabi establishment the justification needed to get 
him out of the Kingdom in 1963. He then re-established himself in his 
country of birth, Syria, before leaving for Jordan in 1979.3
However, the opposition al-Albani encountered from the Wahhabi 
religious establishment was not merely intellec-
tual. By putting into question the methodologi-
cal foundations upon which the Wahhabis had 
built their legitimacy, he was also challenging 
their position in the Saudi religious field. 
From its inception, Wahhabism had estab-
lished itself as a religious tradition—at the core 
of which laid a number of key books, both in 
creed and law. This tradition had been mo-
nopolized by a small religious aristocracy from 
Najd, first centred around Muhammad bin ‘Abd 
al-Wahhab and his descendants (known as the 
Al al-Shaykh) before opening up to a small 
number of other families. In the Saudi system as 
it took shape, the members of this aristocracy 
would become the only legitimate transmitters 
of the Wahhabi tradition; in this context, inde-
pendent scholars were excluded because they 
had not received “proper ‘ilm” from “qualified” 
ulama.
Traditional Wahhabi ‘ilm, therefore, was the 
fruit of a process of transmission and depended on the number of 
ijazas—a certificate by which a scholar acknowledges the transmis-
sion of his knowledge (or part of it) to one of his pupils, and author-
izes him to transmit it further—given by respected Wahhabi scholars. 
This is the very logic al-Albani—who, himself, owned very few of these 
certificates—would challenge by promoting his critical approach. As a 
matter of fact, according to al-Albani, transmission has no importance 
whatsoever, because, every hadith being suspect, the fact that it was 
narrated by a respected scholar cannot guarantee its authenticity. On 
the contrary, the important process is accumulation—a good scholar 
of hadith being someone who has memorized a large sum of hadith 
and, more importantly, the biographies of a large number of transmit-
ters. Thus, the science of hadith can be measured according to objec-
tive criteria unrelated to family, tribe, or regional descent, allowing for 
a previously absent measure of meritocracy. More importantly, al-Alba-
ni’s claim of being more faithful to the spirit of Wahhabism than ‘Abd 
al-Wahhab himself made the former’s ideas very popular among Salafi 
youth.
Religious entrepreneurs
For all these reasons, al-Albani’s ideas would rapidly become a means 
for Salafi religious entrepreneurs from outside the Wahhabi aristocracy 
to challenge the existing hierarchy. Al-Albani himself quickly gathered 
a large following, in Saudi Arabia and beyond. He would soon have to 
be recognized, despite the initial hostility of the Wahhabi religious es-
tablishment, as one of the leading figures in Salafism. 
In the mid-1960s, a number of al-Albani’s disciples in Medina founded 
al-Jamaa al-Salafiyya al-Muhtasiba (The Salafi Group which Commands 
Good and Forbids Evil), a radical faction of which, led by Juhayman al-
‘Utaybi, would storm the grand mosque of Mecca in November 1979. 
Many of the group’s members—and especially its scholars—were either 
of Bedouin descent or non-Saudi residents, and were thus marginalized 
in the religious field. Their activism came, in part at least, as a response to 
their marginalization.4 One of the main religious figures of this group—
who was “lucky” enough to have been thrown out of the Kingdom in 1978 
and therefore did not take part in the 1979 events—was Muqbil al-Wadi‘i, 
who subsequently re-established himself in his native Yemen and be-
came the country’s most prominent Salafi scholar.
In the late 1980s, some of al-Albani’s pupils, led by a Medinan shaykh 
called Rabi‘ al-Madkhali, formed an informal religious network gener-
ally referred to as al-Jamiyya (“the Jamis”, named after one of their key 
members, Muhammad Aman al-Jami). Beyond their focus on hadith, 
the Jamis became known for emphasizing al-Albani’s calls not to in-
dulge in politics and for denouncing those who did. Again, many of 
the Jamis were of peripheral origin (al-Madkhali was from Jazan, on 
the Yemeni border, while al-Jami was from Ethiopia) and had therefore 
been excluded from all leading positions in the religious field. They 
would finally gain prominence in the early 1990s, when the Saudi gov-
ernment supported them financially and institutionally, in the hope 
of creating an apolitical ideological counterweight to the Islamist op-
position led by the al-Sahwa al-Islamiyya (the Islamic Awakening), an 
informal religio-political movement which appeared in Saudi Arabia 
in the 1960s as a the result of a hybridization 
between Wahhabism, on religious issues, and 
the ideas of the Muslim Brotherhood, on po-
litical issues.5 
In the 1990s, a few students of al-Albani 
would go so far as to challenge both the 
Wahhabi religious aristocracy and al-Albani 
himself. Following the teachings of an In-
dian shaykh called Hamza al-Milibari,6 they 
would promote the centrality of hadith, while 
criticizing al-Albani for relying, in his critique 
of hadith, on the methods used by late tra-
ditionists—at least so they claimed. On the 
contrary, they would pride themselves for re-
lying exclusively on the methodology of the 
early traditionists (that is those anterior to 
al-Dar Qutni (917-995)) and would therefore 
name their approach manhaj al-mutaqad-
dimin (the methodology of the early ones). 
Again, most of these scholars were peripheral 
figures, such as Sulayman al-‘Alwan, a very 
young—al-‘Alwan was born in 1970 and started to become known as 
a scholar while he was in his twenties—shaykh of non-tribal descent, 
and ‘Abdallah al-Sa‘d, whose family had come from the city of Zubayr 
in Modern Iraq. The two of them would later become key figures in 
the Saudi Jihadi trend, challenging the political order after they had 
challenged the religious order. As a consequence, 
they would be arrested and jailed after the May 
2003 bombings. 
Muhammad Nasir al-Din al-Albani’s denuncia-
tion of the “Wahhabi paradox” and his promotion 
of a new approach to the critique of hadith as the 
pillar of religious knowledge have prompted a 
revolution within Salafism, challenging the very 
monopoly of the Wahhabi religious aristocracy. As 
a consequence, al-Albani’s ideas have given inde-
pendent Salafi religious entrepreneurs a weapon 
with which to fight their way into previously very 
closed circles. Although none have yet achieved 
al-Albani’s prestige, some have become recog-
nized scholars. Interestingly enough, al-Albani’s 
rise to prominence as a de facto part of an estab-
lishment he once rejected has encouraged some 
of disciples, proponents of the “methodology of 
the early ones,” to call—along al-Albani’s earlier 
line—for an even “purer” approach to the critique 
of hadith. As this shows, the revolutionary power 
of his method remains intact.
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For Al-Albani … 
hadith alone may 
provide answers to 
matters not 
found in the 
Quran …
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